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We review a recent shift in conceptions of interoception and its relationship to
hierarchical inference in the brain. The notion of interoceptive inferencemeans
that bodily states are regulated by autonomic reflexes that are enslaved by
descending predictions fromdeep generativemodels of our internal and exter-
nal milieu. This re-conceptualization illuminates several issues in cognitive
and clinical neuroscience with implications for experiences of selfhood
and emotion. We first contextualize interoception in terms of active (Bayesian)
inference in the brain, highlighting its enactivist (embodied) aspects. We then
consider the key role of uncertainty or precision and how this might translate
into neuromodulation. We next examine the implications for understanding
the functional anatomy of the emotional brain, surveying recent observations
on agranular cortex. Finally, we turn to theoretical issues, namely, the role of
interoception in shaping a sense of embodied self and feelings. We will draw
links between physiological homoeostasis and allostasis, early cybernetic
ideas of predictive control and hierarchical generative models in predictive
processing. The explanatory scope of interoceptive inference ranges from expla-
nations for autism and depression, through to consciousness. We offer a brief
survey of these exciting developments.
This article is part of the themed issue ‘Interoception beyond homeostasis:
affect, cognition and mental health’.1. Introduction
Recent years have seen the emergence of a framework within cognitive neuro-
science that offers exactly the right set of concepts to talk about the body and
mind in terms of beliefs about the body (and oneself). On this view, the brain is
not an elaborate stimulus-response linkbut a statistical organ that actively generates
explanations for the stimuli it encounters—in terms of hypotheses that are tested
against sensory evidence. This perspective can be traced back to Helmholtzian
formulations of unconscious inference [1]. Over the last few years, the underlying
idea has been formalized to cover deep or hierarchical Bayesian inference–about
the hidden causes of our sensations—and how these inferences induce beliefs
and behaviour [2–7]. ‘Explanations’, ‘hypotheses’ and ‘beliefs’ should in this
context be understood not as consciously held mental states, but as neuronally
encoded probability distributions (i.e. Bayesian beliefs) over the hidden causes of
sensory signals. The biophysical encoding of these ‘beliefs’ is, technically, in
terms of sufficient statistics like the mean or expectation of a distribution.
In the last few years, ‘Bayesian brain’ ideas have been applied in the context
of interoception (figure 1), which refers to the perception and integration of
autonomic, hormonal, visceral and immunological signals [8,9]—or more infor-
mally as the sense of the body ‘from within’. On some of these views [7,10],
emotional experience and experiences of embodied selfhood emerge from
top-down inference on the (multimodal) causes of interoceptive afferents,
generalizing so-called two-factor or evaluative theories of emotion and
proprioceptive
predictions
interoceptive
predictions
exteroceptive
predictions
Figure 1. Inference and perception across different modalities. Green
arrows represent exteroceptive predictions and prediction errors underlying
perception of the external world. Orange arrows represent proprioceptive
predictions (and prediction errors) generating action through active inference.
Blue arrows represent interoceptive predictions (and prediction errors) under-
lying emotional processing and autonomic regulation. Integrated experiences
of embodied selfhood emerge from the joint hierarchical content of self-
related predictions across all these dimensions, including—at hierarchically
deep levels—multimodal and amodal predictions. Adapted from Seth [7].
(Online version in colour.)
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these kinds of perceptual experience are as subject to (implicit
and perhaps idiosyncratic) beliefs, as are perceptions of the
external world. Beyond this, the context of interoception
brings about further shifts in how to think about the relation-
ships between body, mind and brain. One such shift is that
generative models of interoceptive signals should be geared
towards control or regulation of physiological variables,
rather than towards accurate representation of some extra-
cranial state-of-affairs [7,12,13]. The two goals remain tightly
interwoven, inasmuch as effective regulation depends on
deployment of sufficiently elaborated predictive models.
This shift recognizes alternative origins to ‘Bayesian brain’
ideas in twentieth century ‘cybernetics’ [14,15] and in doing
so, points to a deep connection between life and mind, in
which cognitive processes are grounded in fundamental evol-
utionary imperatives to maintain physiological homeostasis
[7,16]. Many other specific implications follow, for example
in reframing the functional basis of a variety of disorders of
emotion and selfhood.
Here, we survey these exciting developments. We first pro-
vide a brief introduction to the framework of prediction error
minimization in the Bayesian brain, emphasizing its embodied
or enactive aspects. These aspects appear prominently in the
role of action in reducing prediction error (i.e. active inference)
and emphasize the key role of uncertainty or precision in shap-
ing the interplay between prior beliefs and sensory evidence.
Precision-weighting of recurrent signalling in cortical hierar-
chies is closely associated with neuromodulation, providing
important clues about developmental origins of conditions
like autism; it is also associated with attention, suggestingnovel accounts for symptom expression due to aberrant
attention to interoceptive signals.
Turning to functional neuroanatomy, we outline the func-
tional architecture of interoceptive inference and review
recent suggestions that perceptual predictions originate prefer-
entially in agranular cortices [9,17], while acknowledging that
direct empirical evidence for interoceptive inference is still to
be uncovered.We next address some theoretical issues, relating
active interoceptive inference to experiences of emotion and
embodied selfhood, highlighting a control-oriented or instru-
mental perspective on interoceptive inference that calls on
cybernetic concepts of predictive regulation, allostatic control
and perceptual control theory [7,13,18]. We conclude by
exploring the implications of these ideas for a sample of clinical
conditions that may reflect false interoceptive inference, either
in their aetiology and/or in symptom expression. While dis-
orders in emotional processing and interoceptive experience
naturally invite explanations in terms of abnormal interocep-
tive inference, we also highlight how this perspective can
illuminate other conditions and symptoms including autism,
fatigue and depression.2. Predictive coding in the Bayesian brain
Current formulations of Helmholtz’s notion are now the most
popular metaphors for neuronal processing and are usually
considered under the Bayesian brain hypothesis as predictive
coding [6,19–21]. Predictive coding is a process theory with a
biologically plausible back story and a considerable amount
of empirical support [21,22]. (See [23] for a review of canoni-
cal microcircuits and predictive coding in perception, [17,24]
for an application of the same ideas to motor control, and [25]
for evidence of feed-forward and feed-back signalling carried
by distinct frequency bands.)
In these schemes, neuronal representations in higher or
deeper levels of neuronal hierarchies generate predictions of
representations in lower levels. These descending predictions
are comparedwith lower-level representations to form a predic-
tion error (usually associated with the activity of superficial
pyramidal cells). This mismatch or difference signal is passed
backup the hierarchy, to update higher representations (usually
associated with the activity of deep pyramidal cells). The recur-
rent exchange of signals between adjacent hierarchical levels
resolves prediction error at each and every level, resulting in
a hierarchically deep explanation for sensory inputs. In compu-
tational terms, the activity of neuronal populations is assumed
to encode Bayesian beliefs or probability distributions over
states in the world that cause sensations (e.g. my visual sen-
sations are caused by a face—see figures 2 and 3). The
simplest encoding corresponds to representing the belief with
the expected value (mean) of a (hidden) cause or expectation.
These causes are referred to as hidden because they have to be
inferred from their sensory consequences. In other words,
they can never be directly observed and are forever hidden
behind a sensory veil.
In short, predictive coding represents a biologically plaus-
ible scheme for updating beliefs about the world based on
sensory samples (figure 2). In this setting, neuroanatomy
and neurophysiology can be regarded as a distillation of stat-
istical or causal structure in the environment that is disclosed
by sensory samples. The resulting anatomy of connections
and their physiology furnish a generative model—generating
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Figure 2. This figure summarizes the hierarchical neuronal message passing that underlies predictive coding. The basic idea is that neuronal activity encodes
expectations about the causes of sensory input, where these expectations minimize prediction error. Prediction error is the difference between (ascending) sensory
input and (descending) predictions of that input. This minimization rests upon recurrent neuronal interactions between different levels of the cortical hierarchy.
Current interpretations suggest that superficial pyramidal cells (red triangles) compare the expectations (at each level) with top-down predictions from deep pyr-
amidal cells (black triangles) of higher levels [22,23]. On the left: this schematic shows a simple cortical hierarchy with ascending prediction errors and descending
predictions. This graphic includes neuromodulatory gating or gain control (blue) of superficial pyramidal cells that determines their relative influence on deep
pyramidal cells encoding expectations through modulation of expected precision (see below and text for details). On the right: this provides a schematic example
in the visual system. It shows the putative cells of origin of ascending or forward connections that convey prediction errors (red arrows) and descending or backward
connections (black arrows) that construct predictions. The prediction errors are weighted by their expected precision that we have associated with the activity of
neuromodulatory systems—here projections from ventral tegmental area (VTA) and substantia nigra (STN). In this example, the frontal eye fields send predictions to
primary visual cortex, which it projects to the lateral geniculate body. However, the frontal eye fields also send proprioceptive predictions to pontine nuclei, which
are passed to the oculomotor system to cause movement through classical reflexes. These descending predictions are also passed to the lateral geniculate body and
constitute corollary discharge. Every top-down prediction is reciprocated with a bottom-up prediction error to ensure predictions are constrained by sensory infor-
mation. The resolution of proprioceptive prediction error is particularly important because this enables descending predictions—about the state of the body—to
cause movement by dynamically resetting the equilibrium or set-point of classical reflexes. Resolving sensory prediction errors through action is known as active
inference (see the text). Adapted from Friston [26]. (Online version in colour.)
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sensory samples. Empirical evidence is now emerging that
shows how prior expectations shape behavioural and neur-
onal signatures of perception, with recent studies in vision
[30–32] and audition [33] providing excellent examples.
More generally, this view of perception emphasizes ‘the
beholder’s share’. See also figure 3:The insight that the beholder’s perception involves a top-down
inference convinced [the art historian Ernst] Gombrich that
there is no ‘innocent eye’: that is, all visual perception is based
on classifying concepts and interpreting visual information.
One cannot perceive that which one cannot classify. [28, p. 287](a) Embodied (active) inference and
precision-weighting
There are two key ways in which prediction errors can be
reduced: the first is by updating predictions to make them
more like the expectations at lower levels (and sensations)
currently in play. This process corresponds to perception, as
implemented in predictive coding. The second way to resolveprediction errors is to change the sensory samples to make
them more like predictions. This entails an active sampling
of the sensorium through a redeployment of sensory surfaces:
e.g. saccadic eye searches or other sensory palpitations.
Placing predictive coding in an embodied or enactive frame-
work in which both action and perception are in the game
of minimizing the same prediction error is known as active
inference [34]. To fully appreciate the bilateral nature of
active inference, one has to consider the embodied context in
which predictions are made (and fulfilled). These predictions
are not only about the world, but also about the body. In
brief, perception can be understood as resolving (exteroceptive)
prediction errors by selecting predictions that best explain
sensations, while behaviour suppresses (proprioceptive) pre-
diction error by changing (proprioceptive) sensations. This
suppression rests on classical reflexes, whose equilibrium
points are set by descending proprioceptive predictions [24].
For example, an intended movement can be elicited by simply
predicting the proprioceptive consequences of a particular
movement trajectory, which will be fulfilled by peripheral
reflexes. Note that only proprioceptive prediction errors are
(a)
(b)
Figure 3. (a) Giuseppe Arcimboldo, The Vegetable Gardener (ca 1590). Oil on
panel. Our percepts are constrained by what we expect to see and the
hypotheses that can be called upon to explain sensory input [27]. Arcim-
boldo, ‘a 16th century Milanese artist who was a favourite of the
Viennese, illustrates this dramatically by using fruits and vegetables to
create faces in his paintings. When viewed right side up, the paintings are
readily recognisable faces’ [28, p. 204]. Adapted from Friston [26].
(b) Faces are probably one of the most important (hidden) causes of our sen-
sations. While in Arcimboldo’s image, viewing right side up is needed for the
configuration of features to appear as a face, when images are already recog-
nizable faces, viewing right side up (by rotating the page) reveals that these
faces might in fact be more different than they appear (this is the so-called
‘Thatcher illusion’). These examples illustrate the complex interplay between
prior expectations and stimulus features that shape perceptual content
(adapted from Little et al. [29]). (Online version in colour.)
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generative model, these movements will also fulfil visual and
other exteroceptive (e.g. somatosensory) predictions. This fol-
lows because descending (multimodal) predictions emanate
from a deep generativemodel that effectively assimilates predic-
tion errors from all modalities—including interoception. In this
context, an important and sometimes overlooked aspect of
active inference is that it implies a counterfactual or conditional
aspect. That is, in order for an action successfully to reduce pre-
diction error, the brain must represent not only the hidden
causes of current sensory signals but also must use these rep-
resentations to predict how sensory signals would change
under specific actions [35]. Interestingly, it has been suggested
that such counterfactual aspects of perceptual prediction
may underlie basic properties perceptual experience, such as
‘presence’ or ‘objecthood’ [36].
To enable predictions about the consequences of action to
be fulfilled, we have to attenuate proprioceptive prediction
errors—that would otherwise deliver unequivocal evidence
that we are not, in fact, acting. This attenuation rests on redu-
cing the precision of proprioceptive prediction errors.Precision can be regarded as a measure of signal-to-noise or
confidence. Mathematically, precision is the inverse variance
or reliability of a signal. Estimating precision speaks to a fun-
damental aspect of inference, namely, the encoding of
precision or expected uncertainty [37–39]. In other words,
we have to infer both the cause of our sensations and the
context, in terms of the (expected or subjective) precision of
sensory evidence. This represents a subtle but ubiquitous
problem for the brain, where the solution rests on modulating
the gain or excitability of neuronal populations reporting
prediction error [21,40,41].
Heuristically, one can regard ascending prediction errors
in cortical hierarchies as broadcasting ‘newsworthy’ infor-
mation that cannot be explained by descending predictions.
However, the brain also has to select the prediction errors it
attends to. It can do this by adjusting their volume or gain.
Those prediction errors that have been assigned high pre-
cision therefore have privileged access to high levels of the
hierarchy and can therefore update high-level expectations.
Empirical evidence suggests that this precision-weighting is
a generic computational process throughout the brain [39]
and may be instantiated through neuromodulatory mechan-
isms of gain control at a synaptic level [42]. The ensuing
neuromodulatory gain control corresponds to a (Bayes-opti-
mal) encoding of precision in terms of the excitability of
neuronal populations reporting prediction errors. This may
explain why superficial pyramidal cells are equipped with
so many synaptic gain control mechanisms, such as NMDA
receptors and classical neuromodulatory receptors like D1
dopamine receptors [43–46]. Furthermore, it places exci-
tation-inhibition balance in a perfect position to mediate
Bayesian belief updating within and among hierarchical
levels [47]. This contextual aspect of predictive coding has
been associated with attentional gain control in sensory pro-
cessing [40,48] and has been discussed in terms of affordance
in the setting of action selection [49–51]. Crucially, the deli-
cate balance of precision over hierarchical levels can have a
profound effect on inference and may underlie false beliefs
in psychopathology [52].3. Interoceptive inference
Key challenges for formal accounts of brain function are
emotion, self-awareness and their disorders. Recently, people
have started to cast emotional processing in terms of predic-
tive coding or inference about interoceptive or bodily states
[9,10,53,54]. The basic argument follows the explanation for
action above, namely, motor reflexes are driven by propriocep-
tive prediction errors. Proprioceptive prediction errors
compare primary afferents from stretch receptorswith proprio-
ceptive predictions that descend to alpha motor neurons in the
spinal cord and cranial nerve nuclei. This effectively replaces
descendingmotor commands with proprioceptive predictions,
which are fulfilled by peripheral reflexes [24]. These predic-
tions rest on deep hierarchical inference about states of the
world, including our own body. Replacing proprioceptive sig-
nals with interoceptive signals, one can see how autonomic
reflexes can transcribe descending interoceptive predictions
into physiological homoeostasis (e.g. blood pressure, glycae-
mia, etc.). Importantly, interoceptive predictions constitute
just one stream of multimodal predictions that are generated
by expectations about the embodied self. On this view,
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versa. Instead, there is a circular causality, where neuronally
encoded predictions about bodily states engage autonomic
reflexes through active inference (see below), while interocep-
tive signals inform and update these predictions. Emotion or
affective content then becomes an attribute of any repre-
sentation that generates interoceptive predictions—where
interoception is necessarily contextualized by concurrent
exteroceptive and proprioceptive cues (figure 1).
A useful way to think about interoceptive inference is as
generalizing physiological (James–Lange) and two-factor or
appraisal (e.g. [11]) approaches to emotion. These formula-
tions regard emotional experience as arising from cognitively
contextualized perception of changes in bodily state. Interocep-
tive inference extends these early ideas to incorporate a smooth
hierarchy of (precision-weighted) predictions and prediction
errors, without assuming any bright line distinction between
cognitive and non-cognitive processing. By analogy with pre-
dictive coding approaches to visual perception, we propose
that emotional content is determined by beliefs (i.e. posterior
expectations) about the causes of interoceptive signals across
multiple hierarchical levels. An important challenge in this
context is to identify which aspects of inference support specifi-
cally conscious emotional experience, with predictions (rather
than prediction errors) being the preferred vehicle [32]. It is
tempting to speculate that deep expectations at higher levels
of the neuronal hierarchy are candidates for—or correlates
of—conscious experience, largely because their predictions
are domain general and can therefore be articulated (through
autonomic or motor reflexes).
Crucially, interoceptive inference augments appraisal
theorieswith the concept of active inference, bywhich interocep-
tive predictions can perform physiological homoeostasis by
enlisting autonomic reflexes [10,13]. More specifically, des-
cending predictions provide a homoeostatic set-point against
which primary (interoceptive) afferents can be compared.
The resulting prediction error then drives sympathetic or para-
sympathetic effector systems to ensure homoeostasis or
allostasis, for example, sympathetic smooth-muscle vasodilat-
ation as a reflexive response to the predicted interoceptive
consequences of ‘blushingwith embarrassment’. This formula-
tion of autonomic reflexes follows exactly the active inference
formulation of motor reflexes that enable the contraction of
striated muscle to be prescribed or enslaved by equilibrium
points set by descending projections to alpha motoneurons in
the spinal cord [24].
Active inference highlights a shift from predictive models
underlying perception of hidden causes of sensory data,
to their use in control or regulation of these causes [7].
Importantly, both (predictive) perception and (predictive)
regulation can involve action, as emphasized by distinguish-
ing epistemic and instrumental active inference [7,12]. The
basic idea is that epistemic (active) inference involves selecting
actions that we expect to increase the fit between predictive
models and hidden causes of sensory signals. This form
of inference may characterize, for example, saccadic eye
movements [35] or exploratory body movements to inform
self-models [55]. Instrumental active inference, by contrast,
leverages predictive models to achieve control of sensory
variables. This perspective has been applied to exteroception in
the guise of ‘perceptual control theory’ [18] which emphasizes
that ‘control systems control what they sense, not what they do’
(italics in the original). Instrumental or control-orientedinference is however particularly relevant to interoception,
where maintenance of physiological variables within homo-
eostatically viable ranges is critical to organism survival. In
this context, exploratory or epistemic interoceptive ‘actions’
may be less evident because they may be more costly: one
does not want to raise one’s blood pressure to physiologically
dangerous levels just to see whether it can return. The associ-
ation of predictive models with control of sensory variables
recalls the cybernetic view that ‘every good regulator of a
systemmust be a model of that system’ [14, p. 89], and the dis-
tinction between instrumental and epistemic actions also
highlights the counterfactual aspects of active inference,
where potential actions are associatedwith their likely sensory
consequences [7,35,36].
In terms of predictive coding, the balance between homoeo-
static reflexes and more goal-directed allostatic behaviour
rests upon the confidence (i.e. precision) placed in deeper expec-
tations about howwewill behave. For example, hypoglycaemia
could induce low-level predictions that mobilize glucose stores
(through autonomic reflexes driven by precise interoceptive
prediction errors). Alternatively, if we can attenuate the pre-
cision of low-level interoception, then proprioceptive
predictions can be fulfilled that preclude domain specific
homoeostatic responses and engage allostatic behaviour,
i.e. preparing and consuming a meal.
As yet, direct empirical evidence for (or against) interocep-
tive predictions or prediction errors is still lacking. While
there is ample circumstantial that fits comfortably with this
framework (see [9,10,54,56], for reviews), the principles of
interoceptive inference rest primarily on the view that percep-
tual inference—whether about theworld or about the body—is
likely to involve a common computational architecture. More-
over, the neuroanatomical properties of brain regions involved
in interoceptive processing can be informatively interpreted
from this perspective, as we describe next.(a) Functional neuroanatomy of interoceptive inference
Translating the computational machinery of interoceptive
inference into a deeper understanding of brain function
requiresmapping its computational elements onto neuroanato-
mical substrates. A number of recent proposals suggest several
convergent features [9,10,13]. The first is that so-called viscero-
motor areas (VMAs), such as the anterior insula cortex (AIC),
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), subgenual cortex (SGC), and
perhaps also, orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) are situated at the
top of an interoceptive hierarchy. The second is that these
areas collectively embody a generative model of interoceptive
responses and issue predictions that, when unpacked at the
lowest hierarchical level, serve as homoeostatic set-points.
These VMAs are known to receive ascending projections
from viscerosensory areas (e.g. posterior and mid-insula) and
their descending connections engage a range of subcortical,
brainstem and spinal cord targets involved in visceromotor
control, such as the periaqueductal grey (PAG) and the para-
brachial nucleus (PBN) [8,57–59]. Visceromotor efferents also
directly innervate viscerosensory areas, potentially providing
a form of efference copy or corollary discharge (i.e. descend-
ing predictions) enabling the formation of (ascending)
interoceptive prediction errors. As well as known anatomical
connectivity patterns, this basic architecture is supported by
cytoarchitectonic observations that VMAs lack a well formed
(granular) layer IV as a target for ascending prediction errors
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Figure 4. A (simplified) neural architecture underlying the predictive coding of
visual, somatosensory and interoceptive signals. The anatomical designations,
although plausible, are used to simply illustrate how predictive coding can
be mapped onto neuronal systems. As in figure 2, red triangles correspond to
neuronal populations (superficial pyramidal cells) encoding prediction error,
while blue triangles represent populations (deep pyramidal cells) encoding
expectations. These provide descending predictions to prediction error popu-
lations in lower hierarchical levels (blue connections). The prediction error
populations then reciprocate ascending prediction errors to adjust the expec-
tations (red connections). Arrows denote excitatory connections, while circles
denote inhibitory effects (mediated by inhibitory interneurons). In this example,
recurrent connections mediate innate (epigenetically specified) reflexes—such
as the suckling reflex—that elicit autonomic (e.g. vasovagal) reflexes in
response to appropriate somatosensory input. These reflexes depend upon
high-level representations predicting both the somatosensory input and intero-
ceptive consequences. The representations are activated by somatosensory
prediction errors and send interoceptive predictions to the hypothalamic
area—to elicit interoceptive prediction errors that are resolved in the periphery
by autonomic reflexes. Oxytocin (in green) is shown to project to the hypothala-
mic area, to modulate the gain or precision of interoceptive prediction error
units. One hypothesis for autism rests on a failure to attenuate the precision
of autonomic prediction errors, thereby precluding expectations about visual
and somatosensory information (e.g. a mother’s face or affiliative touch) that
is not accompanied by autonomic input (see the text). FFA, fusiform face
area; AIC, anterior insular cortex; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; OFC, orbitofrontal
cortex; PAG, periaqueductal grey; PBN, parabrachial nucleus. (Online version
in colour.)
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to the issuing of predictions, in both interoceptive [9] and
motor [17] domains. Figure 4 shows a schematic of the sort
of functional anatomy implied by interoceptive inference
(that we will appeal to later in the context of autism).
(b) Interoceptive inference and embodied selfhood
Having described the computational architecture of intero-
ceptive inference and its potential functional neuroanatomy,
we are now in a position to explore how this framework
can illuminate more theoretical issues in the nature and
experience of selfhood. In everyday life, we experience our‘selfhood’ as continuous and integrated. While it may be
adaptive to experience being a ‘self’ in this way, it would
be a mistake to assume on this basis that there is such a
thing as unitary self-process underlying these experiences.
Clinical conditions and experimental manipulations amply
illustrate that experiences of selfhood unfold across many
partially independent and partially overlapping levels of
description; levels which can be teased apart in the laboratory
or which may fall apart during psychiatric or neurological ill-
ness. A simple classification, from ‘low’ to ‘high’ levels,
would range from experiences of being and having a body
[10,60,61], through to the experience of perceiving the
world from a particular point of view (a first person perspec-
tive, see [62,63]), to experiences of intention and agency
[64,65], and at higher levels the experience of being a continu-
ous self over time (a ‘narrative’ self or ‘I’ that depends on
episodic autobiographical memory, see [66]) and finally, a
social self, in which my experience of being ‘me’ is shaped
by how I perceive others’ perceptions of me [67]. In this puta-
tive classification, interoception plays a key role in structuring
experiences of ‘being and having a body’ (i.e. embodied self-
hood) and may also shape selfhood at other, hierarchically
higher levels.
There is accumulating evidence that interoception plays a
key role in shaping experiences of body ownership. Illusions
of body ownership, like the rubber hand illusion and the
so-called ‘full body’ illusion, while normally induced by false
visuo-tactile congruence, can also be induced by ‘cardio-
visual’ feedback in which a virtual body (or body part) flashes
in timewith a participant’s heartbeat [68,69]. Recent extensions
of these studies have also shown that visual feedback of respir-
atory patterns can have a similar effect [70], providing support
for a multimodal influence of interoception on embodied
selfhood. The ways in which interoceptive predictions and
prediction errors shape ‘higher’ levels of selfhood remain excit-
ing areas for investigation [71]. As discussed next, much
current evidence in these areas is found in studies of abnormal
experiences of selfhood.4. Selfhood and psychopathology
Very generally, the (predictive coding) process theory that we
have sketched above for active inference speaks to the synaptic
mechanisms that might underlie false inference in psychiatric
conditions: in brief, the formal constraints implicit in predictive
coding require a modulatory gain control on ascending predic-
tion errors. A recent paper [72] exemplifies how one can
understand functional (hysterical) symptoms as false inference
about the causes of abnormal sensations, movements or their
absence. This example offers a simple (neurophysiological)
explanation of symptomatology that is otherwise rather
difficult to diagnose or formulate. This theme is emerging
repeatedly in psychiatry: from false inference as an account
of positive symptoms (hallucinations and delusions) in
schizophrenia [73], to the loss of central coherence in autism
[74]. Moreover, it is remarkable that the same role for
precision-weighting of prediction errors emerges from differ-
ent theoretical treatments of learning and inference in the
brain—including predictive coding in vision [20], free-energy
accounts of perception and behaviour [4] and hierarchical
Bayesian models of learning [75].
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Perhaps the best example of applying concepts from intero-
ceptive inference to understanding disorders of selfhood
can be found in autism research. Recently, much of the phe-
nomenology of autism has been cast in terms of false
inference that results from a loss of prior precision, relative
to sensory precision [74,76,77]. However, in autism the conse-
quences of increases in (or a failure to attenuate) sensory
precision are also being considered in a developmental con-
text, in which one has to accommodate the consequences
for acquisition or learning of deep generative models. This
is particularly interesting in relation to interoceptive inference
because it touches on the acquisition of generative models
that distinguish between self and other.
One line of thinking here is that a failure to contextualize
interoceptive cues, elicited by interactions with the mother,
precludes a proper attribution of the agency to the interocep-
tive consequences of prosocial interactions [78]. In brief, the
idea is that a failure to attenuate the precision of interoceptive
prediction errors would not only render autistic infants
unduly sensitive to interoceptive cues (i.e. autonomic hyper-
sensitivity) but would have profound implications for a sense
of self versus other. This follows from the inability to ignore
the absence of interoceptive signals associated with nurtur-
ing (e.g. breastfeeding) during affiliative interactions with
(m)others. In short, the autistic infant could never learn that
the nurturing and prosocial (m)other were the same hidden
cause or external object [78] (figure 4). This has several inter-
esting implications for attachment, theory of mind, and a lack
of central coherence that characterizes the disorder in later life
[79]. It also provides an interesting explanation for intero-
ceptive hypersensitivity (cf. an emotional echopraxia) in
autism and failure to engage with prosocial (exteroceptive)
cues [80]. If this explanation is right, then it provides a
clear pointer to abnormalities of (precision) gain control in
cortical systems mediating interoceptive inference such as
the anterior insular and cingulate cortex [54,81].
Potential interoceptive abnormalities in autism are unlikely
to reside at any single level in the interoceptive hierarchy. In a
recent study, a comparison of autistic individuals with controls
found that autism was associated with (i) reduced objective
interoceptive sensitivity, quantified using standard heartbeat
detection tasks and (ii) an increased trait interoceptive sensibil-
ity, measured using subjective questionnaires, when compared
with controls [82]. These results can be interpreted in terms of
an increased ‘interoceptive trait prediction error’ (ITPE) in
autism; i.e. a larger mismatch between subjective expecta-
tions about interoceptive accuracy and objective interoceptive
sensitivity. Interestingly, across both autistic individuals and
controls, the magnitude of ITPE correlated with self-reported
anxiety, recalling the early proposal of Paulus & Stein [83]
which associated anxiety with an interoceptive prediction
error (though not in a Bayesian framework). One complication
that may nuance this view is that autism often co-occurs with
alexithymia (difficulties in identifying and describing one’s
own emotions); a recent study found that atypical interocep-
tion was associated with alexithymia not autism, though this
study did not specifically consider ITPEs [84]. More generally,
the heterogeneous nature of autismmay exclude single process
explanations and may underlie apparent inconsistencies in the
current empirical data (e.g. another recent study [85] found
decreased not increased subjective body awareness in autism).(b) Depression and fatigue
Beyond autism, interoceptive inference is emerging as a
powerful framework within which to understand depression,
fatigue and their interactions. Depression exerts a profound
impact on quality of life and carries a very high socio-
economic cost. Fatigue is a prominent symptom across a
variety of disorders and also exacts a high toll on quality
and productivity of life. While depression and fatigue encom-
pass a wide range of cognitive, behavioural and physiological
aspects, some recent albeit speculative proposals have
implicated disrupted interoception in their aetiology.
In one version of this story, peripheral endocrine
and immunological changes accompanying or preceding
depressive onset lead to persistently imprecise (‘noisy’)
interoceptive afferents [9,86]. This in turn leads to lower
precision-weighting of (i.e. reduced attention to) ascending
interoceptive signals and correspondingly greater reliance on
interoceptive priors for maintaining physiological homoeosta-
sis. Given the translation of interoceptive predictions into
homeostatic set-points, this process could set up a positive feed-
back loop in which greater reliance on prior predictions
generates increasingly large andunreliable interoceptive predic-
tion errors, which in turn increases the reliance on the now
dysfunctional interoceptive predictions. At some point, the
ensuing dyshomoeostasis will tip over into fatigue and sickness
behaviour that signal the initial stages of depression [9].
In another version of the story [87], while fatigue and
depression are still considered as responses to the interocep-
tive experience of dyshomoeostasis, these now take the form
of metacognitive beliefs about the brain’s capacity to success-
fully regulate bodily states (allostatic self-efficacy). Fatigue is
proposed to represent an early response to dyshomoeostasis
that retains adaptive value (like sickness behaviours in gen-
eral), while a generalized belief of low allostatic self-efficacy
following prolonged (experienced) dyshomoeostasis may trig-
ger depression, in a way that recalls cognitive theories of
‘learned helplessness’ [88]. Both these accounts of depression
are supported by the involvement of agranular visceromotor
cortices in the pathophysiology of depression (e.g. [89]). To
further refine, distinguish and empirically test these formu-
lations may require advanced model-based neuroimaging
analyses—of the sort being developed under the rubric of
‘computational psychiatry’ [90–92].5. Concluding remarks
Applying the framework of active inference to interoception
provides a powerful set of concepts within which to conceive
the neurofunctional basis of emotion, embodied selfhood and
allostatic control. The main points can be summarized as fol-
lows. Interoceptive inference parallels other applications of
active inference (or prediction error minimization) in propos-
ing that sensory areas convey ascending prediction errors
that are compared with descending predictions across a hier-
archy of perceptual processing. For interoceptive inference,
predictions issue from (agranular) VMAs and project to vis-
cerosensory areas (to provide corollary feedback) as well as
to brainstem and subcortical areas (to engage autonomic
homoeostatic reflexes). Importantly, visceromotor predictions
are best interpreted as providing homoeostatic set-points that
enslave autonomic reflexes and guide allostatic (behavioural
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errors at different hierarchical levels and timescales. This
perspective emphasizes the anticipatory control-oriented
nature of interoceptive inference [7], recalling the role of pre-
dictive models in cybernetic theories of regulation [14,15]
as well as their counterparts in (exteroceptive) perception,
e.g. perceptual control theory [18,93].
Mapping the computational architecture of interoceptive
inference to neuroanatomical substrates—and considering the
key role of precision-weighting—provides the tools to connect
these ideas to (i) theories of emotion and embodied selfhood
and their experimental manipulation, and (ii) a range of clinical
conditions which express interoceptive symptoms and/or
plausibly originate via disruptions in interoceptive inference.
In terms of theoretical implications, emotional feeling states
can be seen as the joint content of interoceptive predic-
tions, while embodied selfhood rests on the multimodal and
amodal predictions that distinguish self-related from non-self
signals via active inference. Accumulating clinical data and
experimental evidence are revealing the mechanisms by
which interoceptive signalling shapes experiences of self, and
also of perceptions of stimuli originating from the external
environment (e.g. [94,95]). However, uncovering empirical
evidence that speaks directly in favour of (or against) interocep-
tive inference stands as an important challenge. Key predictions
of the framework are that (i) descending signals from VMAs
carry predictions about the causes of interoceptive signals
(and, further, that in doing so they serve as homoeostatic
set-points), (ii) ascending signals targetingVMAs convey intero-
ceptive prediction errors, and (iii) emotional oraffective contents
depend primarily on interoceptive predictions rather than
prediction errors. Future research could test these predictions
using advanced laminar fMRI methods to potentially distin-
guish ‘prediction’ from ‘prediction error’ responses [31], or by
capitalizing on natural variability in physiological rhythms
(e.g. heartbeat variability) to model ongoing interoceptive pre-
diction errors that might be reflected in electrophysiological
signals (Klaas Enno Stephan 2016, personal communication;
see also [96]). Microneurography techniques—which allow
direct recording of peripheral nerve traffic [97]—might also pro-
vide an innovative means of isolating interoceptive prediction
and prediction error signals.
Extending active inference to include autonomic reflexes
and interoceptive predictions raises many further interesting
questions [26]. For example, can the putative role of neuro-
modulators (e.g. dopamine and oxytocin) in mediating the
precision of prediction errors help to explain the close relation-
ship between arousal and anxiety? What is the relationship
between exteroception and interoception during self-
observation and how does this depend upon the attenuation
of the precision of respective prediction errors [98]? Do von
Economo cells in infragranular cortical layers conveyinteroceptive predictions from the insular cortex to the amyg-
dala and other subcortical targets [99]? How does the
control-oriented nature of interoceptive inference shape the
qualitative aspects of interoceptive experience, and what in
general determines the conscious status of interoceptive predic-
tions? Key questions about hierarchical inference and the role
of interoception are also being addressed in the new field of
neuropsychoanalysis [100].
The practical implications of these ideas are highlighted by
their application to a variety of clinical conditions inwhich aty-
pical interoceptive inference may play important roles in
aetiology and/or in symptom expression. Emotional disorders
like alexithymia are relatively straightforward to explain
in terms of atypical interoception, while more complex and
heterogeneous constructs like anxiety have been considered
in terms of interoceptive prediction error for more than a
decade [53,83,101]. Recent developments have focused on
depression and fatigue as emerging from the interoceptive
experience of chronic dyshomoeostasis, whether directly or
via metacognitive beliefs in inadequate allostatic self-efficacy
[9,87]. Autism, also highly heterogeneous, seems to have a
common interoceptive foundation, possibly with a develop-
mental origin and symptom expression characterized by
discrepancies between (reduced) objective interoceptive sensi-
tivity and (enhanced) self-appraisal of interoceptive ability.
Importantly, the involvement of interoceptive inference in
these and other conditions—including, for instance, deper-
sonalization disorder (see [102])—opens new avenues for
diagnosis through physiological measures and computational
psychiatry approaches, and potential clinical intervention via
interoceptive training and feedback.
Altogether, considering embodied selfhood through the
lens of prediction error minimization brings a new way to
think about an old doctrine. Rene Descartes, besides dividing
the world into res cogitans and res extensa, also achieved a cer-
tain notoriety for introducing the doctrine of the ‘beast
machine’ (ca 1694). He argued that while humans had minds
directing their behaviour, non-human animals (‘brutes’) were
nothing more than unthinking, unfeeling machines that
breathe, digest, perceive and move ‘like clockwork’. Now
that we can see how human minds are deeply grounded in
embodied physiology, and that similar functional principles
may unite physiological regulation with perception of the
external world and the guidance of actions and behaviour,
an inversion of Descartes’ doctrine seems plausible: that our
subjective experiences of selfhood may arise because of, and
not in spite of, the fact that we too are ‘beast machines’.
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